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LITIGATING WAR: THE 
JUSTICIABILITY OF EXECUTIVE 
WAR POWER 
CHRIS SMITH* 
The war power of the United States, like its other powers and like the 
police power of the states, is subject to applicable constitutional 
limitations.1 
The constitutional delegation of the war-declaring power to the 
Congress contains a discoverable and manageable standard imposing 
on the Congress a duty of mutual participation in the prosecution of 
war.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Courts frequently dismiss claims against the executive’s use of the 
war power as being non-justiciable political questions. This lack of a 
judicial check has created a situation in which meaningful checks and 
balances on the war power are found only in the Executive Branch 
itself.3 But the Constitution places the bulk of war powers in the 
hands of Congress.4 Executive usurpation of Congress’s constitutional 
prerogative to initiate hostilities has significantly weakened the 
separation of powers. 
Congress sought to rectify this power imbalance by passing the 
War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution creates a private 
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 1.  Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919) 
(citations omitted). 
 2.  Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 3.  See Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 
1329 (2012) (noting the existence of a “growing body of scholarship suggesting that, especially 
during national security crises, meaningful checks and balances can be found internally within 
the Executive Branch”). 
 4.  See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 7 (6th ed. 2016).  
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right of action for claims against the executive war power.5 The 
Resolution also restrains courts’ use of the political question doctrine 
as a tool to dismiss claims against the executive war power.6 To ensure 
that courts properly assess the justiciability of claims against the 
executive war power, Congress should modernize the War Powers 
Resolution. 
Part I of this Note provides a background description of the 
allocation of war powers in both the Constitution and historical 
practice. Part II discusses the political question doctrine and how the 
Supreme Court has applied it to foreign affairs cases. Part III discusses 
the Vietnam War and the passage of the War Powers Resolution. Part 
IV provides an overview of how courts have applied the political 
question doctrine to the executive war power since the passage of the 
War Powers Resolution. Part V suggests how Congress and the courts 
can restore the constitutional balance of war powers. 
I. WAR POWERS IN THE CONSTITUTION 
AND IN HISTORICAL PRACTICE 
Early historical practice suggests executive-legislative balance in 
the realm of war powers, but the executive has been dominant since at 
least 1950.7 The executive’s relatively recent domination of war 
powers is antithetical to the language of the Constitution and the 
intention of the Framers. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution 
empowers Congress to “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal,” “raise and support Armies,” “provide and maintain a 
Navy,” and “organiz[e], arm[], discipline[e]” and “call[] forth the 
Militia.”8 In contrast, the President’s sole enumerated war power is 
his position as “Commander in Chief” of the armed forces.9 
A. War Powers in the Constitution 
It is clear from the records of the Constitutional Convention that 
the Framers intended for Congress alone to have the power to initiate 
 
 5.  Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 511 n.1 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 6.  Edwin B. Firmage, The War Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 65, 68 (1977) (“Congress has removed much of the force of 
the political question doctrine as an impediment to independent judicial review of 
executive war power acts by adopting the War Powers Resolution.”). 
 7.  See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF 
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 10 (1993).  
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 9.  Id. art. II § 2. 
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hostilities.10 At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson 
emphasized that “the important power of declaring war is vested in 
the legislature at large . . . .”11 William Paterson, a member of the 
Constitutional Convention and a Supreme Court Justice from 1793 to 
1806, wrote that “it is the exclusive province of congress to change a 
state of peace into a state of war.”12 Justice Paterson held that the 
President cannot authorize hostilities on his own, because “[t]hat 
power is exclusively vested in Congress . . . .”13 James Madison—the 
Father of the Constitution—agreed that the power to declare war was 
“essentially [and] exclusively . . . vested in the Legislature . . . .”14 As 
President, Madison praised the wisdom of the Constitution in vesting 
the power to declare war in “the legislative department of the 
Government.”15 
Declarations of war have largely disappeared since 1945, possibly 
suggesting that Congress’s power to declare war may be little more 
than a historical artifact.16 The Framers, however, were acutely aware 
of the impending extinction of formal declarations of war. Just months 
after the Constitutional Convention, Alexander Hamilton wrote that 
“the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into 
disuse . . . .”17 Because “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the 
constitution is intended to be without effect,”18 the phrase “declare 
war” cannot be interpreted as a mere artifact of a bygone era. The 
disuse of formal declarations of war during the Framers’ own time 
suggests that they intended “declare war” to include less formal 
congressional authorizations of hostilities. By including the power to 
grant letters of marque and reprisal in the War Powers Clause, the 
Framers gave Congress authority over hostilities that do not meet the 
threshold of war.19 And until the mid-twentieth century, presidents 
 
 10.  William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 695, 698 (1997). 
 11.  Id. at 717. 
 12.  United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Treanor, supra note 10, at 746. 
 15.  Id. at 726. 
 16.  Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Exhuming the Seemingly Moribund Declaration of War, 
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 89, 90 (2008). 
 17.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 18.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803). 
 19.  See Jules Lobel, “Little Wars” and the Constitution, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 61, 69–70 
(1995) (“The early history of the nation also supports a reading of the Marque and Reprisal 
Clause that provides Congress the power to authorize a broad spectrum of armed hostilities not 
rising to the level of declared war.”). 
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observed that the executive alone could not constitutionally involve 
the nation in war.20 
B. War Powers and the Early Presidents 
The President’s sole enumerated constitutional war power is his 
position as Commander-in-Chief, and early practice suggests that 
Commander-in-Chief was simply “a generic term referring to the 
highest officer in a particular chain of command.”21 Major General 
Anthony Wayne was called Commander-in-Chief when he led the U.S. 
Army in the 1790s.22 General Wayne’s successor, James Wilkinson, was 
also known as the Commander-in-Chief.23 At the North Carolina 
ratifying convention, future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell said 
that although the President “is to command the military forces of the 
United States,” he “has not the power of declaring war by his own 
authority . . . . The power of declaring war is expressly given to 
Congress . . . .”24 
President Washington often obtained congressional authorization 
before using force.25 The first military conflict of Washington’s 
presidency was the Northwest Indian War.26 On September 29, 1789, 
Congress passed a bill empowering President Washington to call upon 
state militias to defend the frontier from American Indians.27 
President Washington also received congressional authorization to 
engage in naval hostilities with the Barbary pirates.28 
Presidents Adams relied on congressional authorization for the 
major foreign policy crisis of his presidency: an undeclared naval war 
with France.29 From May 1798 to March 1799, Congress passed no 
fewer than four acts empowering the President to act against armed 
French vessels.30 
 
 20.  FRANCIS D. WORMUTH AND EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE 
WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 28, 142, 151 (2d ed. 1989). 
 21.  Id. at 109. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 110. 
 24.  Id. at 112. 
 25.  Abraham D. Sofaer, The Power Over War, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 33, 41 (1995).  
 26.  Adam Mendel, Comment, The First AUMF: The Northwest Indian War, 1790–1795, 
and the War on Terror, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1309, 1311 (2016). 
 27.  Id. at 1309.  
 28.  WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 20, at 59–60. 
 29.  Id. at 60. 
 30.  Id. 
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During the Jefferson and Madison administrations, Congress 
enacted at least ten statutes authorizing the use of force against the 
Barbary pirates.31 In 1805, President Jefferson said that “Congress 
alone is constitutionally invested with the power of changing our 
condition from peace to war . . . .”32 When President Madison 
determined that hostilities with Britain had reached a breaking point, 
he dutifully requested and received a declaration of war from 
Congress.33 
C. War Powers and the Early Congresses 
When the executive did intrude on congressional war powers, 
early Congresses asserted themselves. Congressman Henry Clay 
harangued General Andrew Jackson after Jackson invaded Spanish 
Florida without congressional authorization.34 Clay was emphatic that 
“[o]f all the powers conferred by the Constitution of the United 
States, not one is more expressly and exclusively granted than that is 
to Congress of declaring war.”35 Even if Jackson’s supporters had 
“succeeded in showing that an authority was conveyed by the 
Executive to General Jackson to take the Spanish posts,” Clay insisted 
that by doing so they “would only have established that 
unconstitutional orders had been given, and thereby transferred the 
disapprobation from the military officer to the Executive.”36 
D. War Powers and the Marshall Court 
Congress’s preeminence in war was supported by the Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice John Marshall. On February 9, 1799, 
Congress authorized the seizure of ships sailing to French ports.37 One 
month later, President Adams ordered Captain Little to seize ships 
sailing to or from French ports.38 Because Adams’s instructions 
differed from those of Congress, the Court held that his instructions 
 
 31.  Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War Power, 81 IND. L.J. 
1199, 1224 (2006). 
 32.  9 ANNALS OF CONG. 19 (1805). 
 33.  See BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42738, INSTANCES OF 
USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798–2017 2 (2017) (“On June 18, 1812 
[when Madison was President], the United States declared war between the United States and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.”).  
 34.  15 ANNALS OF CONG. 631–55 (1819). 
 35.  Id. at 647. 
 36.  Id. at 653. 
 37.  Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 170–71. (1804). 
 38.  Id. at 171. 
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did not authorize the seizure.39 The Court unambiguously declared: 
“The whole powers of war being by the constitution of the United 
States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted 
to as our guides in this enquiry.”40 
E. Executive Usurpation of Congress’s War Powers and Arguments 
from Historical Gloss 
Since 1950, the executive has engaged in numerous hostilities 
without congressional authorization.41 For example, the so-called 
“police action” in Korea was unauthorized by Congress,42 but resulted 
in over 100,000 U.S. casualties.43 The numerous “humanitarian” 
interventions of the 1990s involved tens of thousands of troops yet 
lacked congressional authorization.44 These large-scale, post-1950 uses 
of unauthorized force are unlike earlier instances, which were 
typically small-scale landings to protect Americans abroad.45 Those 
uses of force did not pose constitutional problems, as there is a near-
universal consensus among scholars that the Commander-in-Chief 
powers include using force to rescue American citizens abroad and to 
protect U.S. embassies and consulates.46 Because the Constitution 
empowers the president to appoint ministers and consuls,47 defending 
embassies falls under the Take Care Clause.48 
Despite their recency, some scholars argue that the post-1950 uses 
of unauthorized force constitute a “historical gloss” on the 
Constitution.49 Justice Frankfurter famously described historical gloss 
as 
 
 39.  Id. at 178–79. 
 40.  Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801), rev’d on other grounds. 
 41.  ELY, supra note 7, at 10.  
 42.  Id. at 10–11. 
 43.  NESE F. DEBRUYNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32492, AMERICAN WAR AND 
MILITARY OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: LISTS AND STATISTICS 2 (2018). 
 44.  See generally Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Clinton Administration and War Powers, 63 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (2000). 
 45.  See WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 20, at 146.  
 46.  See John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1379, 1393–94 (1988) (arguing that “[v]irtually everyone agrees” that the 
President can use military force to protect American people, embassies, and legations). 
 47.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 48.  Id. at art. II, § 3; see also Cunningham v. Neagle (In re Neagle), 135 U.S. 1, 60–68 
(1890) (holding that the Take Care Clause covers “the rights, duties, and obligations growing 
out of the constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the 
nature of the government under the constitution . . . .”).  
 49.  Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers 
Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1149, 1154–56 (2001). 
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a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged 
in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, 
making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of 
our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ 
vested in the President . . . .50 
Later Courts have looked favorably upon Frankfurter’s use of 
“historical gloss.”51 Such prominent scholars as Professor Curtis 
Bradley have also accepted that “arguments from history are—and 
are likely to remain—pervasive in the separation of powers context.”52 
The Court has held, however, that just because “an 
unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not render 
that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date.”53 Similarly, 
scholars as eminent as Professor John Hart Ely have ridiculed 
historical gloss as a constitutional “‘adverse possession’ theory.”54 
Furthermore, even if one accepts historical gloss arguments, it is not 
clear that they apply to the executive war power. Professors Francis 
Wormuth and Edwin Firmage argue that “[i]n the case of executive 
wars, none of the conditions for the establishment of constitutional 
power by usage is present.”55 The text of the Constitution clearly 
places war powers in the hands of Congress, not the President. For 
this reason, “[t]he early Presidents, and indeed everyone in the 
country until the year 1950, denied that the President possessed such a 
power.”56 Thus, “[i]t can only be audacity or desperation that leads the 
champions of recent presidential usurpations to state that ‘history had 
legitimated the practice of presidential war-making.’”57 
II. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
Although the Constitution vests Congress with the power to 
initiate war, courts frequently dismiss claims against executive war 
power as posing nonjusticiable political questions. In the case of 
 
 50.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 51.  See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (holding that a history of 
Congressional acquiescence to executive power may legitimize presidential action). 
 52.  Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 416 (2012). 
 53.  Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546–47 (1969). 
 54.  ELY, supra note 7, at 10. 
 55.  WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 12, at 151. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
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Baker v. Carr, the Court held that a political question involves at least 
one of the following six elements: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department;  
[2] or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it; 
[3] or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;  
[4] or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government;  
[5] or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made;  
[6] or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.58 
The Baker decision provided unclear guidance on how to apply the 
political question doctrine to issues of war.59 The Court recognized 
that issues arising from foreign relations “frequently turn on 
standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a 
discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature . . . 
.”60 But the Court emphasized that it is an “error to suppose that 
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond 
judicial cognizance.”61 For example, courts are able to recognize the 
existence of armed conflict.62 Furthermore, if a case presents “clearly 
definable criteria,” then “the political question barrier falls away.”63 
One of the Court’s few applications of the political question 
doctrine to foreign affairs was in Goldwater v. Carter.64 When 
President Carter terminated the U.S.’s mutual defense treaty with 
Taiwan, Senator Barry Goldwater led a group of twenty-five current 
and former members of Congress in a suit against President Carter.65 
Although the D.C. District Court ruled that President Carter could 
not terminate a treaty without congressional approval, the Court of 
 
 58.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 59.  Id. at 211–14. 
 60.  Id. at 211. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  See id. at 212–13 (citation omitted). 
 63.  Id. at 214. 
 64.  444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
 65.  Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.D.C. 1979). 
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Appeals reversed.66 Without hearing oral arguments, a divided 
Supreme Court dismissed the complaint.67 Justices Rehnquist, Burger, 
Stewart, and Stevens all held that the case raised a non-justiciable 
political question.68 
Justice Powell, writing in dissent, thought that dismissing the case 
as a political question was “incompatible with this Court’s willingness 
on previous occasions to decide whether one branch of our 
Government has impinged upon the power of another.”69 Justice 
Brennan—the author of Baker v. Carr—also dissented.70 He thought 
that Justice Rehnquist “profoundly misapprehend[ed] the political-
question principle as it applies to matters of foreign relations.”71 
Justice Brennan agreed that “the political-question doctrine restrains 
courts from reviewing an exercise of foreign policy judgment by the 
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment 
has been ‘constitutional[ly] commit[ted].’”72 But, Justice Brennan 
continued, timing matters. The political question doctrine is not 
applicable when courts are “faced with the antecedent question 
whether a particular branch has been constitutionally designated as 
the repository of political decisionmaking power. The issue of 
decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a matter of 
constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it falls within 
the competence of the courts.”73 
Given the Justices’ own disagreements on the political question 
doctrine, it is unsurprising that lower courts have described the 
doctrine as having “shifting contours and uncertain underpinnings.”74 
It is no surprise then that the political question doctrine has played a 
limited role in Supreme Court jurisprudence; the Court has relied on 
the doctrine only a handful of times.75 Nevertheless, lower courts have 
 
 66.  Id. at 965; Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 67.  Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996. 
 68.  Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 69.  Id. at 1001 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 70.  Id. at 1006–07 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 71.  Id. at 1006. 
 72.  Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1962)). 
 73.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 74.  Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 69 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Ramirez de 
Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)). 
 75.  El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 856 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“The political question doctrine has occupied a more limited 
place in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence than is sometimes assumed. The Court has relied on 
the doctrine only twice in the last 50 years.”). 
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frequently relied on the political question doctrine when analyzing 
challenges to the executive war power.76 
III. THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE PASSAGE 
OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 
The Vietnam War incited an enormous amount of popular protest 
and congressional opposition against the executive war power. It also 
encouraged litigation, which was largely unsuccessful. But the tide 
began to turn in the latter stages of the war when the U.S. intervened 
in Cambodia.77 Less than a year after the U.S. signed the Paris Peace 
Accords and ostensibly ended its participation in the war,78 Congress 
passed the War Powers Resolution over President Nixon’s veto.79 The 
War Powers Resolution clearly indicated Congress’s desire to reassert 
its constitutional authority over war-making decisions.80 In so doing, 
Congress “removed much of the force of the political question 
doctrine as an impediment to independent judicial review of 
executive war power acts . . . .”81  
A. The Courts, the Political Question Doctrine, and the Vietnam War 
The Vietnam War was not the first American war to have its 
constitutionality challenged in court. During the Korean War, James 
Bolton was convicted of refusing to comply with the draft.82 On 
appeal, Bolton argued the Korean War was unconstitutional because 
Congress had not declared war.83 The Second Circuit dismissed the 
complaint for lack of standing, because Bolton had not been ordered 
to Korea.84 However, the court’s ruling did not rest on the political 
question doctrine, and the court suggested that a person ordered “to 
 
 76.  Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 
3d 283, 297 (D.D.C. 2016); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 337 (D.D.C. 1987); Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 77.  Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), rev’d 484 F.2d 1307 
(2d Cir. 1973). 
 78.  GEORGE R. DUNHAM AND DAVID A. QUINLAN, U.S. MARINES IN VIETNAM: THE 
BITTER END, 1973–1975 11 (1990) (reporting that the United States provided South Vietnam 
with $1.8 billion total in military aid during Fiscal Years 1974 and 1975).  
 79.  DYCUS ET AL., supra note 4, at 349. 
 80.  See War Powers Resolution § 2, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (West 2018). 
 81.  Firmage, supra note 6, at 68. 
 82.  United States v. Bolton, 192 F.2d 805, 806 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
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fight in an ‘undeclared war’” would have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the order.85 
Multiple servicemembers challenged the constitutionality of the 
Vietnam War.86 Private First Class Berk and Specialist Orlando had 
long-running suits requesting injunctions against their deployment 
orders because the Vietnam War had not been properly authorized by 
Congress.87 The Second Circuit held that war powers cases did not 
necessarily constitute political questions, because “the constitutional 
delegation of the war-declaring power to the Congress contains a 
discoverable and manageable standard imposing on the Congress a 
duty of mutual participation in the prosecution of war.”88 However, 
the court ultimately concluded that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 
war appropriations, and conscription legislation constituted “mutual 
participation in the prosecution of war.”89 
Private Luftig unsuccessfully sought an injunction to prevent him 
from being sent to Vietnam, arguing the war was unconstitutional.90 In 
rejecting his argument, the D.C. Circuit aggressively applied the 
political question doctrine to the executive’s war powers: “the 
Constitution precludes judges from overseeing the conduct of foreign 
policy or the use and disposition of military power . . . .”91 
Reflecting the growth of anti-war sentiment, the D.C. Circuit 
discarded its broad Luftig interpretation of the political question 
doctrine in 1973.92 The court held that the judiciary is, in fact, able to 
determine the allocation of war powers between the political 
branches.93 Because Congress had repealed the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution in 1971, Senators and Representatives could no longer 
justify “the indefinite continuance of the war . . . .”94 Furthermore, 
congressional appropriations failed to constitute approval of the 
 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971); DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d 
Cir. 1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967). 
 87.  Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1040. 
 88.  Id. at 1042; see also DaCosta, 448 F.2d at 1369 (“[T]here was sufficient legislative 
action in extending the Selective Service Act and in appropriating billions of dollars to carry on 
military and naval operations in Vietnam to ratify and approve the measures taken by the 
Executive, even in the absence of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.”). 
 89.  Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1042. 
 90.  Luftig, 373 F.2d at 665. 
 91.  Id. at 666. 
 92.  Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
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war.95 As “every schoolboy knows,” a Congressman who was 
completely opposed to the war might still vote for military 
appropriations “because he was unwilling to abandon without support 
men already fighting.”96 These votes—”cast in pity and piety”—
should not be construed “as though they were votes freely given to 
express consent.”97 
Nevertheless, the court dismissed the claim as a political 
question.98 President Nixon’s stated policy was “to bring the war to an 
end as promptly as was consistent with the safety of those fighting,” 
and the court concluded that it lacked the ability to analyze whether 
the President’s actions were consistent with that policy.99 
Supreme Court Justice William Douglas—an outspoken opponent 
of the Vietnam War100—rejected the application of the political 
question doctrine to litigation involving the executive war power.101 
When Massachusetts brought a suit arguing that U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court declined to hear 
the case by a 6-3 vote, with Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart 
dissenting.102 Justice Douglas issued a powerful fourteen-page dissent, 
declaring that “[t]he question of an unconstitutional war is neither 
academic nor ‘political.’”103 The Court was not tasked with 
determining “the wisdom of fighting in Southeast Asia,” but with 
deciding “whether under our Constitution presidential wars are 
permissible . . . .”104 Because the Supreme Court’s duty is to interpret 
the Constitution, Justice Douglas argued that the case was 
justiciable.105 
Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman brought another war-related 
suit106 that caught Justice Douglas’s eye. Representative Holtzman 
sought to end the U.S. bombing of Cambodia that the President was 
conducting without congressional authorization, arguing that her right 
 
 95.  Id. at 615. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 616. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  James L. Moses, William O. Douglas and the Vietnam War: Civil Liberties, Presidential 
Authority, and the “Political Question”, 26 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 1019, 1019 (1996). 
 101.  Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 887 (1970) (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
 102.  Id. at 900. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 896. 
 105.  Id. at 894. 
 106.  Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).  
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to a vote on the declaration of hostilities was being impaired.107 The 
district court sympathized with Holtzman, noting that majorities in 
both Houses had opposed the continued bombing of Cambodia.108 
Furthermore, the court rejected the notion “that Congress must 
override a Presidential veto in order to terminate hostilities which it 
has not authorized.”109 If this were the rule, then the President would 
only need a vote of “one-third plus one of either House in order to 
conduct a war . . . .”110 
Thus, the court granted an injunction for Representative 
Holtzman, although it postponed the date of the injunction to allow 
the government to appeal for a stay.111 The Court of Appeals stayed 
the injunction, but Justice Douglas vacated the stay.112 He decried the 
“ton of bombs” dropped on “Cambodian farmers whose only ‘sin’ is a 
desire for socialized medicine to alleviate the suffering of their 
families and neighbors.”113 However, the other Justices quickly 
reversed Justice Douglas and reinstated the stay.114 After the Court of 
Appeals heard the case, it concluded that Representative Holtzman 
lacked standing because she had not been denied the right to vote or 
debate on Cambodia.115 
B. The War Powers Resolution 
Cambodia loomed large in the minds of the members of Congress 
who passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973.116 The report by the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs opened by acknowledging that 
“[t]he Cambodian incursion of May 1970 provided the initial impetus 
for a number of bills and resolutions on the war powers.”117 Congress 
had been “disturbed by the lack of prior consultation,” and the result 
was a “near crisis in the relations between the executive and 
 
 107.  Id. at 547. 
 108.  Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 565–66. 
 112.  Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321, 1321 (1973). 
 113.  Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316, 1317 (1973). 
 114.  Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. at 1321–22. 
 115.  Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973) (“She has fully 
participated in the Congressional debates which have transpired since her election to the 
Congress. The fact that her vote was ineffective was due to the contrary votes of her colleagues 
and not the defendants herein.”). 
 116.  See H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 2348 (1973). 
 117.  Id. 
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legislative branches . . . .”118 With the War Powers Resolution, 
Congress intended to “reassert its own prerogatives and 
responsibilities” by “restor[ing] the balance provided for and 
mandated in the Constitution.”119 
Congress acknowledged that it did not possess a monopoly on war 
powers.120 The president had the “right to defend the Nation against 
attack, without prior congressional authorization, in extreme 
circumstances such as a nuclear missile attack or direct invasion.”121 
Rather, Congress was concerned with “the commitment of U.S. 
military forces exclusively by the President (purportedly under his 
authority as Commander in Chief) without congressional approval or 
adequate consultation with the Congress.”122 Hence, the purpose of 
the War Powers Resolution is to “fulfill the intent of the framers of 
the Constitution” by ensuring congressional input when U.S. troops 
enter “hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the 
continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.”123 The 
President may introduce forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities 
only with congressional authorization or in response to “a national 
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or 
possessions, or its armed forces.”124 
The House report provides guidance on what Congress meant by 
“hostilities and imminent hostilities”: “any time combat military 
forces [are] sent to another nation to alter or preserve the existing 
political status quo or to make the U.S. presence felt.”125 The report 
used the 1962 U.S. intervention in Thailand as an example of an 
intervention that “would have required Presidential reports” if the 
Resolution had existed then.126 In the Thailand intervention, the U.S. 
sought to intimidate Laotian communists by sending the Seventh 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 2349. 
 120.  Id. at 2348–49. 
 121.  Id. at 2349. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  50 U.S.C.A. § 1541(a) (West 2018). 
 124.  50 U.S.C.A. § 1541(c) (West 2018). 
 125.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 2352 (“Reporting is required when the President ‘commits 
United States Armed Forces equipped for combat to the territory, airspace or waters of a 
foreign nation, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair or 
training of United States Armed Forces’.”). 
 126.  Id. 
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Fleet to Thai waters and five thousand troops to the Thai-Laos 
border.127 
Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution calls on the president to 
consult with Congress “in every possible instance” before introducing 
forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities.128 The House report 
emphasized that consultation should occur “prior to the commitment 
of armed forces . . . .”129 “Consult” is not a mere synonym of inform; 
“consult” requires the President to ask Congress for its advice, 
opinions, and, depending on the situation, its approval.130 
Furthermore, the President should try to consult with Congress even 
“in extraordinary and emergency circumstances . . . when it is not 
possible to get formal congressional approval . . . .”131 
Section 4 requires the President to provide Congress with 
information related to the use of armed forces.132 The major 
requirement is submitting a report to the Speaker of the House and 
President pro tempore of the Senate within forty-eight hours of 
introducing forces into hostilities, imminent hostilities, or “in numbers 
which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for 
combat already located in a foreign nation.”133 The phrase “numbers 
which substantially enlarge” should be given a “common sense 
understanding . . . .”134 For example, increasing the number of Marines 
at an embassy from five to ten would not require a report, nor would 
adding one thousand troops to U.S. forces in Europe.135 President 
Kennedy, however, would have been required “to report to Congress 
in 1962 when he raised the number of U.S. military advisers in 
Vietnam from 700 to 16,000.”136 
Section 5 requires the president to terminate the use of armed 
forces within sixty days if he does not receive congressional 
authorization.137 The president may obtain a thirty-day extension if 
 
 127.  Edmund F. Wehrle, “A Good, Bad Deal”: John F. Kennedy, W. Averell Harriman, and 
the Neutralization of Laos, 1961–1962, 67 PAC. HIST. REV. 349, 370 (1998). 
 128.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1542 (West 2018). 
 129.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 2350 (emphasis added). 
 130.  Id. at 2351. 
 131.  Id. at 2350. 
 132.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1543 (West 2018). 
 133.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1543(a) (West 2018). 
 134.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 2352. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1544(b) (West 2018). 
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necessary to safely withdraw troops.138 Section 5(c) allows Congress to 
use a concurrent resolution to force the withdrawal of troops.139 This 
power, however, is probably akin to a legislative veto, and therefore 
Section 5(c) is likely unconstitutional under INS v. Chadha.140 
Sections 6 and 7 discuss the procedure of introducing a joint 
resolution, and Section 8 expressly states that appropriations do not 
constitute authorization.141 Lastly, Section 9 is a separability clause.142 
President Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution, but Congress 
overrode his veto.143 No president has accepted the Resolution as 
constitutional.144 Many opponents of the Resolution argue that it is an 
unconstitutional infringement on the President’s Commander-in-
Chief powers.145 There is some truth to this, as Section 2 excessively 
restricts the situations in which the President can unilaterally use 
force.146 Section 2 should expand the situations in which the President 
is allowed to introduce armed forces without congressional 
authorization to include rescuing American citizens abroad and 
protecting American embassies and consulates.147 As noted above, 
Section 5(c) is likely an unconstitutional legislative veto. The 
separability clause in Section 9, however, ensures that these minor 
errors are not fatal to the Resolution. 
As Professor Stephen Carter of Yale has recognized, the War 
Powers Resolution is constitutional because it merely defines and 
enforces the war power from Article I of the Constitution.148 Defining 
the power and coupling it with reasonable enforcement mechanisms is 
a legitimate exercise of congressional authority that “does not intrude 
on any presidential prerogative.”149 
 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1544(c) (West 2018). 
 140.  462 U.S. 919, 957–59 (1983). But see Ely, supra note 46, at 1395–98 (arguing that 
Section 5(c) is distinguishable from Chadha and is constitutional). 
 141.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1545–1547 (West 2018). 
 142.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1548 (West 2018). 
 143.  DYCUS ET AL., supra note 4, at 349. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 
101, 119 (1984). 
 146.  See Ely, supra note 46, at 1393. (“[Section] 2(c) not only is too restrictive of necessary 
presidential authority, but is almost inevitably so. Virtually everyone agrees that it should have 
included the protection of American citizens as one of the justifications for presidential military 
action.”). 
 147.  See id. at 1394.  
 148.  Carter, supra note 145, at 101–02. 
 149.  Id. at 102. 
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IV. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
SINCE THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 
No successful claim has been made against the executive war 
power since the passage of the War Powers Resolution. Courts have 
repeatedly held that the constitutional allocation of war powers raises 
a non-justiciable political question.150 But courts have not entirely 
ruled out the possibility of a plaintiff’s having standing, and at least 
one court has held that the War Powers Resolution creates a private 
right of action.151 
A. Central America and the Caribbean 
In Crockett v. Reagan, twenty-nine members of Congress brought 
suit against President Reagan, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, and 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.152 The members of Congress 
argued that the defendants had violated both the Constitution and the 
War Powers Resolution by sending nearly sixty U.S. servicemembers 
to El Salvador without obtaining a congressional declaration of war or 
submitting a report to Congress.153 The D.C. District Court held that 
determining whether U.S. forces had been introduced into hostilities 
was a matter of “congressional, not judicial, investigation and 
determination.”154 Therefore, the court dismissed the claim and the 
appellate court affirmed this decision.155 
In 1983, twelve members of Congress brought suit against 
President Reagan, alleging that “U.S.-sponsored terrorist raids against 
various towns and villages in Nicaragua” constituted unauthorized 
acts of war.156 The D.C. District Court dismissed the case under the 
political question doctrine.157 Relying on Crockett, the court judged 
itself incompetent to inquire “into sensitive military matters.”158 
Furthermore, ruling that President Reagan was violating the 
 
 150.  See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 297 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Smith v. 
Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 337 (D.D.C. 1987); 
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
 151.  Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 511 n.1 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 152.  Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 895 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983). 
 153.  Id. at 895–96. 
 154.  Id. at 898. 
 155.  Id. at 903. 
 156.  Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D.D.C. 1983). 
 157.  Id. at 600. 
 158.  Id. 
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Constitution would have expressed “a lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government.”159 
Shortly after the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983, the 
D.C. District Court heard a case brought by eleven members of 
Congress against President Reagan.160 The Reagan administration 
claimed that it had consulted with Congress before sending troops 
into Grenada, in accordance with Section 3 of the War Powers 
Resolution.161 The President, however, had only informed Congress 
that the U.S. was invading Grenada after he had given the order to 
invade.162 Nevertheless, the court ruled that because the plaintiffs still 
had “the institutional remedies afforded to Congress as a body,” it 
would be “unwise” for the court to involve itself in this executive-
legislative dispute, and dismissed the case.163 
B. Persian Gulf 
When the U.S. began escorting ships in the Persian Gulf and 
battling Iranian naval vessels, 110 members of the House of 
Representatives brought suit arguing that these actions triggered the 
Section 4(a)(1) reporting requirement of the War Powers 
Resolution.164 The D.C. District Court dismissed the case under the 
political question doctrine, ruling that a determination of whether the 
executive had violated Section 4(a)(1) would also require a 
determination of whether the U.S. was “engaged in ‘hostilities’ or in 
‘situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly 
indicated by the circumstances.’”165 The court felt that determining 
whether the U.S. was involved in hostilities “would be both 
inappropriate and imprudent . . . .”166 
In the buildup to the Persian Gulf War, Sergeant Michael Ange 
sought an injunction to prevent President Bush from deploying him to 
the Persian Gulf.167 Ange argued that his deployment orders violated 
 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324, 325–26 (D.D.C. 1983). 
 161.  Michael Rubner, The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the 
Invasion of Grenada, 100 POL. SCI. Q. 627, 630 (1985). 
 162.  Id. at 630–31. 
 163.  Conyers, 578 F. Supp. at 327.  
 164.  Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 334 (D.D.C. 1987). 
 165.  Id. at 337. 
 166.  Id. But see Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1335 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the 
United States was engaged “in hostile military activities vis-a-vis Iran in order to protect Gulf 
Shipping”). 
 167.  Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 510 (D.D.C. 1990).  
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the War Powers Clause of the Constitution and Sections 4(a) and 5(b) 
of the War Powers Resolution.168 The court took a broad view of the 
political question doctrine, refusing to even consider “precisely what 
allocation of war power the text of the Constitution makes to the 
executive and legislative branches.”169 
But the political question doctrine was far from settled. On the 
same day that the D.C. District Court dismissed Ange’s claim as a 
non-justiciable political question, it held in Dellums v. Bush that suits 
challenging executive war power do not automatically raise political 
questions.170 The court had “no hesitation in concluding that an 
offensive entry into Iraq by several hundred thousand United States 
servicemen . . . could be described as a ‘war’ within the meaning of 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, of the Constitution.”171 Referring to the 
D.C. Circuit’s Vietnam-era decision in Mitchell v. Laird, the Dellums 
court concluded that it had the power to determine that the U.S. was 
at war.172 It held that historical practice demonstrated courts’ 
competence to determine the existence of war, because courts 
frequently determine the existence of war when construing treaties, 
statutes, and insurance contracts.173 Nevertheless, the court denied the 
plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, as the plaintiffs 
represented only about ten percent of Congress.174 
C. Kosovo 
Arguably, the Kosovo War resulted in the most legally significant 
suit against the executive war power.175 On March 24, 1999, the U.S. 
began bombing Yugoslavia, ostensibly to halt Yugoslav repression of 
the Kosovar Albanians.176 Five weeks later, the House of 
Representatives defeated a resolution declaring war on Yugoslavia by 
a vote of 427 to 2.177 The House also rejected a resolution authorizing 
 
 168.  Id. at 511. 
 169.  Id. at 512. 
 170.  Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144–46 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 171.  Id. at 1146. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. at 1150–51. 
 175.  Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37–39 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 203 F.3d 19, 19 
(D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 176.  Id. at 37. But see JOHN NORRIS, COLLISION COURSE: NATO, RUSSIA, AND KOSOVO 
xxiii (2005) (“It was Yugoslavia’s resistance to the broader trend of political and economic 
reform—not the plight of Kosovar Albanians—that best explains NATO’s war.”). 
 177.  Id. at 38. 
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President Clinton to bomb Yugoslavia by a tie vote of 213 to 213.178 
Twenty-six members of the House who had voted against 
authorization of the bombing campaign sued President Clinton, 
arguing that he had violated the War Powers Clause of the 
Constitution by bombing Yugoslavia without congressional 
authorization.179 They also claimed that President Clinton had 
violated the War Powers Resolution by not withdrawing American 
military forces from Yugoslavia within sixty days of the initiation of 
hostilities.180 
The D.C. District Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
because Congress as a whole had “sent distinctly mixed messages” 
about the air strikes.181 Therefore, the court did not need to determine 
whether the case fell under the political question doctrine, although it 
did say that “case[s] brought by a legislator alleging a violation of the 
War Powers Clause” do not automatically raise non-justiciable 
political questions.182 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the ruling, 
although each judge filed a concurring opinion.183 Judge Silberman 
would have held that the political question doctrine applied.184 In an 
oblique reference to the district court’s reasoning in Dellums v. Bush, 
Judge Silberman wrote that it was “irrelevant that courts have 
determined the existence of a war in cases involving insurance 
policies and other contracts,” because those cases did not turn on 
“whether there was a war as the Constitution uses that word . . . .”185 
In fact, according to Judge Silberman, there is no “constitutional test 
for what is war.”186 Furthermore, Judge Silberman opined that The 
Prize Cases show that the President can repel aggressive acts by third 
parties without congressional authorization.187 Therefore, challenges 
to the constitutionality of executive war power must prove that the 
President is repelling an aggressive act—that is, the President did not 
 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 39. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 44. 
 182.  Id. at 40 n.5. 
 183.  Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
 184.  Id. at 24–25 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 185.  Id. at 26. 
 186.  See id. at 25 (citations omitted) (“Appellants cannot point to any constitutional test for 
what is war.”).  
 187.  Id. at 27. 
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initiate the conflict.188 Of course, “[t]he question of who is responsible 
for a conflict is, as history reveals, rather difficult to answer,” and 
Judge Silberman concluded that courts are unable to answer it.189 
Judge Tatel did not agree that the case raised a non-justiciable 
political question.190 Plaintiffs who otherwise had standing could bring 
a suit against the President for alleged violations of the War Powers 
Clause and the War Powers Resolution.191 Judge Tatel wrote that 
courts routinely determine which police searches are unreasonable, 
which government actions establish a religion, and which districts are 
so gerrymandered they violate equal protection of the laws.192 None of 
those constitutional terms are self-defining, and the standards for 
analyzing those terms have developed through judicial 
decisionmaking.193 Thus Judge Tatel averred, “[c]ourts have proven no 
less capable of developing standards to resolve war powers 
challenges.”194 To counter Judge Silberman’s reference to The Prize 
Cases, Judge Tatel noted that there the Court had managed to 
determine the existence of an undeclared war by simply looking at the 
facts of the conflict.195 Referring the early Supreme Court case of Bas 
v. Tingy,196 Judge Tatel reminded his colleagues that in the year 1799 
the Court had recognized “that sporadic battles between American 
and French vessels amounted to a state of war . . . .”197 Why then, the 
judge wondered, was the D.C. Circuit in the year 2000 incapable of 
determining “whether months of daily airstrikes involving 800 U.S. 
aircraft flying more than 20,000 sorties and causing thousands of 
enemy casualties amounted to ‘war’ . . . ?”198 
D. Terrorism 
El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States was 
another important case that emerged from Clinton administration air 
strikes.199 In response to terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya 
 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. at 37 (Tatel, J., concurring). 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. at 38. 
 196.  4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). 
 197.  Clinton, 203 F.3d at 40. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
SMITH_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/1/2019  4:26 PM 
200 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
and Tanzania, President Clinton ordered missile strikes against a 
factory in Sudan that was allegedly producing chemical weapons for 
Osama bin Laden.200 Tragically, the factory produced pharmaceuticals, 
not chemical weapons, and the destruction of the factory resulted in 
tens of thousands of deaths.201 When the factory’s owner brought suit, 
the D.C. Circuit dismissed the claim as raising a non-justiciable 
political question.202 The court distinguished between claims 
questioning the wisdom of foreign policy decisions and claims 
presenting purely legal issues.203 Because El-Shifa revolved around the 
wisdom of selecting targets for missile strikes, it raised a non-
justiciable political question.204 However, a claim involving foreign 
policy would be justiciable if it merely alleged that “the Executive has 
exceeded the scope of prescribed statutory authority or failed to obey 
the prohibition of a statute or treaty.”205 
More recently, Captain Nathan Smith brought suit challenging 
President Obama’s exercise of war power in hostilities against 
terrorists.206 Captain Smith argued that the U.S. military campaign 
against ISIL was not authorized by Congress and thereby violated the 
War Powers Resolution.207 President Obama’s legal bases for the 
military campaign against ISIL were the 2001 and 2002 
Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMF).208 Congress had 
passed both AUMFs, and both explicitly stated that Congress was 
authorizing military force in accordance with Sections 5(b) and 
8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.209 The 2001 AUMF empowered 
the President to use force against “nations, organizations, or persons 
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons . . . .”210 The 2002 AUMF empowered the 
 
 200.  Id. at 838. 
 201.  Werner Daum, Universalism and the West: An Agenda for Understanding, HARV. 
INT’L REV., Summer 2001, at 19, 19.  
 202.  El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 844. 
 203.  Id. at 842 (citing Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., 
concurring)). 
 204.  See id. at 843–44 (“The case at hand involves the decision to launch a military strike 
abroad . . . . we conclude that both [of the plaintiff’s claims] raise nonjusticiable political 
questions.”). 
 205.  See id. at 842 (citations omitted). 
 206.  Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 288 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 207.  Id. at 285. 
 208.  Id. at 286–87. 
 209.  Id.  
 210.  2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224.  
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President to “defend the national security of the United States against 
the continuing threat posed by Iraq.”211 
Captain Smith argued that neither AUMF provided a legal basis 
for the campaign against ISIL.212 The 2001 AUMF did not apply 
because ISIL was established three years after September 11 and 
broke with al-Qaeda no later than 2013.213 In regard to the 2002 
AUMF, Captain Smith noted that the Defense Department’s general 
counsel had conceded that “the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s 
regime in Iraq was the primary focus of the 2002 AUMF.”214 
Furthermore, National Security Advisor Susan Rice told Congress 
that the Obama administration did not rely on the 2002 AUMF for 
actions against ISIL.215 
The D.C. District Court, however, disagreed with Captain Smith 
and dismissed his claim as a non-justiciable political question.216 The 
court believed that it lacked the standards to determine whether ISIL 
was affiliated with the perpetrators of September 11 or whether a 
military campaign against ISIL was necessary to “defend the national 
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by 
Iraq.”217 
Nevertheless, the court also rejected a broad interpretation of the 
political question doctrine as applied to the executive war power.218 
Using the language of Baker v. Carr, the court acknowledged that “it 
is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches 
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”219 The Smith court 
concluded that “[t]he presence of a political question ‘turns not on the 
nature of the government conduct under review but more precisely on 
the question the plaintiff raises about the challenged action,’” and 
thus agreed with the El-Shifa court.220 
 
 211.  2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498. 
 212.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition of Motion to Dismiss at 34–44, Smith v. 
Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-CV-00843-CKK).  
 213.  Id. at 40. 
 214.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 35. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 297 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 217.  Id. at 298. 
 218.  Id.  
 219.  Id. (quoting El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 841 
(D.C. Cir. 2010)).  
 220.  Id. (quoting El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 841 
(D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Courts should open their doors to litigants who challenge the 
executive war power, because the political question doctrine does not 
apply to such challenges.221 These challenges are based on determining 
“whether a particular branch has been constitutionally designated as 
the repository of political decisionmaking power,” and therefore these 
challenges are “matter[s] of constitutional law . . . within the 
competence of the courts.”222 Even if one believes that Frankfurter’s 
historical gloss theory applies to the executive war power, Congress is 
able to reclaim that power.223 Professor Bradley writes that although 
“historical practice supports unilateral presidential authority” in the 
war powers setting, “little practice establishes that Congress is 
disabled from restricting or regulating that authority . . . . To the extent 
that custom-based presidential authority is considered nonexclusive, it 
is more analogous to some sort of license or easement than to adverse 
possession.”224 
A. Strengthening the War Powers Resolution 
The War Powers Resolution’s text clearly demonstrates Congress’s 
intent to reclaim its war powers.225 There are several ways Congress 
could strengthen the War Powers Resolution, starting by creating a 
private right of action. Although at least one court has held that the 
War Powers Resolution creates a private right of action,226 Congress 
should make this explicit in the Resolution’s text. Professor Ely 
recommended giving this right of action to “[a]ny member of the 
United States Armed Forces ordered to the relevant theatre of 
operations, [and] any Member of Congress . . . .”227 He also suggested 
language instructing courts that “[s]uch action shall not be 
dismissed . . . on the ground that the plaintiff lacks standing, the case 
 
 221.  See David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 723 
(2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, stretching from early in our history through 
Youngstown to numerous contemporary war powers cases, is rife with instances of the Court’s 
resolving questions of the Executive’s war powers, just as it has adjudicated other separation of 
powers disputes between the political departments”). 
 222.  See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 223.  See DYCUS, supra note 4, at 47 (“Of course, Congress can always reclaim and exercise 
its constitutional authority.”). 
 224.  Curtis A. Bradley and Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual 
Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, SUP. CT. REV. 1, 55 (2014). 
 225.  50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (West 2018).  
 226.  Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 511 n.1 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 227.  ELY, supra note 7, at 135. 
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presents a political question, the case is unripe, or as an exercise of the 
court’s equitable discretion.”228 
Section 2(a) should define “hostilities or imminent hostilities.” 
The definition used in the House report would suffice: “any time 
combat military forces [are] sent to another nation to alter or 
preserve the existing political status quo or to make the U.S. presence 
felt.”229 Professor Ely’s definition would also work: “a substantial 
possibility that United States Armed Forces will be attacked, 
irrespective of any hope that the presence of such forces will deter 
such attack.”230 
Section 2(c) should expand the situations in which the President is 
allowed to introduce armed forces without congressional 
authorization to include rescuing American citizens abroad and 
protecting American embassies and consulates.231 Because the 
President has almost unquestioned authority to use force in those 
situations, not including them serves only to weaken the War Powers 
Resolution.232 
Section 3 should specify which members of Congress the president 
must consult before introducing armed forces into hostilities or 
imminent hostilities.233 The consulted members of Congress should 
include, at the very least, these eighteen individuals: the President pro 
tempore of the Senate; the Speaker of the House; the Chair and 
Ranking Member of the Senate Committees on Armed Services, 
Foreign Relations, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and 
Intelligence; and the Chair and Ranking Member of the House 
Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Homeland Security, 
and Intelligence. 
The requirement that the President withdraw forces within sixty 
days absent congressional authorization should be reduced to twenty 
days. It is virtually inconceivable that the President would ever be in a 
situation where armed forces were engaged in hostilities for more 
than three weeks before Congress could convene. Congress managed 
to declare war on Japan the day after Pearl Harbor,234 and the 
 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 2352.  
 230.  ELY, supra note 7, at 134.  
 231.  See Ely, supra note 46, at 1393–94. 
 232.  See supra p. 7 and notes 45–48. 
 233.  See Ely, supra note 46, at 1400–01. 
 234.  Joint Resolution Declaring a State of War Against the Imperial Government of Japan, 
Pub. L. No. 77-328, 55 Stat. 795 (1941).  
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Authorization for the Use of Military Force against the perpetrators 
of September 11 was passed and approved within a week of the 
attacks.235 
As noted above, Section 5(c) is likely an unconstitutional 
legislative veto under Chadha.236 Thus, Section 5(c) should be 
dropped. 
By defining key terms, creating a right of action, clarifying 
requirements, and dropping unconstitutional elements, Congress 
could make the War Powers Resolution a useful instrument in 
restoring the constitutional balance of war powers. Courts can help 
restore this constitutional balance by narrowly applying the political 
question doctrine. 
B. Courts are Capable of Adjudicating War-Related Claims 
Federal and state courts have long demonstrated that they have 
the judicially discoverable and manageable standards necessary to 
determine the existence of war, even in the absence of a formal 
declaration.237 As early as 1800, the Supreme Court held that “every 
contention by force between two nations, in external matters, under 
the authority of their respective governments, is not only war, but 
public war.”238 The Supreme Court has not been deterred by the lack 
of a formal declaration of war, having determined that “it is a matter 
of history that all along our Western frontier there has been a 
succession of Indian wars, with great destruction of life and property, 
and yet seldom has there been a formal declaration of war on the part 
of either the government or the Indians.”239 Similarly, the Supreme 
 
 235.  Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 236.  See supra p. 194 and note 140. 
 237.  See Marks v. United States, 161 U.S. 297, 302–03 (1896) (“[I]t is a matter of history that 
all along our Western frontier there has been a succession of Indian wars, with great destruction 
of life and property, and yet seldom has there been a formal declaration of war on the part of 
either the government or the Indians.”); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800) (opinion of 
Washington, J.) (“[E]very contention by force between two nations, in external matters, under 
the authority of their respective governments, is not only war, but public war.”); Koohi v. 
United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[F]rom a practical standpoint ‘time of war’ 
has come to mean periods of significant armed conflict rather than times governed by formal 
declarations of war.”); Darnall v. Day, 37 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Iowa 1949) (“[A]s commonly 
understood . . . war ends when hostilities cease.”); Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 44 N.E.2d 
687, 689 (Mass. 1942) (“A conflict between the armed forces of two nations under authority of 
their respective governments would be commonly regarded as war.”).  
 238.  Bas, 4 U.S. at 40 (opinion of Washington, J.). 
 239.  Marks, 161 U.S. at 302–03. 
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Court of Iowa has ruled that war “refers to the period of hostilities 
and not to a technical state of war . . . .”240 
  Courts have put forth commonsense definitions of war and 
hostilities. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts defined war 
as “[a] conflict between the armed forces of two nations under 
authority of their respective governments . . . .”241 The Ninth Circuit 
has used an even simpler definition: “periods of significant armed 
conflict . . . .”242 Using this definition, the Ninth Circuit determined 
that the U.S. was involved in a war when it protected Persian Gulf 
shipping during the Iran-Iraq War.243 
Sitting on the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Kavanaugh recognized that 
cases involving national security or international relations do not 
automatically raise political questions.244 “Indeed,” Judge Kavanaugh 
wrote, “from the time of John Marshall to the present, the Court has 
decided many sensitive and controversial cases that had enormous 
national security or foreign policy ramifications.”245 
In a positive sign for the future, the Roberts Court did not apply 
the political question doctrine in Zivotofsky.246 Menachem 
Zivotofsky’s parents unsuccessfully applied for a passport and 
consular report that would have recorded his birthplace as 
“Jerusalem, Israel.”247 An Act of Congress allowed U.S. citizens born 
in Jerusalem to record their birthplace as “Jerusalem, Israel.”248 
However, the State Department’s policy was that passport officials 
should write only “Jerusalem.”249 When Zivotofsky’s parents brought 
suit, the Secretary of State argued it should be dismissed as a political 
question.250 Both the District Court251 and the Appeals Court252 agreed 
with the Secretary. But when the Supreme Court heard the case, eight 
 
 240.  Darnall, 37 N.W.2d at 280. 
 241.  Stankus, 44 N.E.2d at 689. 
 242.  Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1334.  
 243.  Id. at 1335. 
 244.  El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 856 n.3 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 191 (2012). 
 247.  Id. at 192–93.  
 248.  Id. at 191. 
 249.  Id. at 191–92.  
 250.  Id. at 191. 
 251.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 99 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d, 571 F.3d 
1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
 252.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
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Justices held that the political question doctrine did not apply.253 Chief 
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, held that courts have the 
standards necessary to examine “the textual, structural, and historical 
evidence” of foreign policy cases.254 Examining evidence and using 
“familiar principles of constitutional interpretation” are not outside 
the purview of the courts; it “is what courts do.”255 
CONCLUSION 
Courts should not hold that challenges to the executive war power 
invariably raise political questions. These challenges concern the 
constitutional allocation of decisionmaking power, and they are 
therefore justiciable. Courts should open their doors to members of 
Congress who seek to assert their constitutional prerogatives and to 
servicemembers who seek assurance that they are fighting in a 
constitutional war. 
 
 
 253.  Clinton, 566 U.S. at 191. 
 254.  See id. at 201. 
 255.  Id. 
